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ABSTRACT 
 
DEFINING A SAMPLE TEMPLATE FOR GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCUREMENTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS 
 
 It is a well-known truth that nobody can easily find a law, act, 
directive, code or a publicly available technical specification which 
describe crytopgraphic-based security systems and/or cryptographic 
modules in Turkey. Besides that, from the international aspect, the only 
government released standarts take place in the “Federal Information 
Standarts Publication (FIPS) 140-2”, published by United States 
“National Institute of Standarts and Technology (NIST)” on May 25th, 
2001 (which became the international standart after Final Commitee 
Document accepted as “ISO/IEC  19790:2006” on March 9th,  2006) 
which specifies the security requirements that should be satisfied by a 
cryptographic module. 
 
Since the protection of sensitive and valuable (sometimes life-
critical) data transfered via critical governmental cryptographic systems is 
very important and requires high confidentiality, the need for defining a 
sample template technical specification of those cryptographic systems is 
that much high.  
 
The sample template specification which is made up in this study 
aims to be a starting point or initiative for preparing a cryptographic 
module specification in governmental procurements. 
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ÖZET 
 
DEVLET KRİPTO İHALELERİ İÇİN ŞARTNAME TASLAĞI 
HAZIRLANMASI ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
 Türkiye’de kriptografik-tabanlı güvenlik sistemleri ve/veya 
kriptografik modülleri tanımlayan bir kanun, yönetmelik, emir veya kamu 
kullanımına açık bir teknik şartnamenin kolaylıkla temin edilemeyeceği iyi 
bilinen bir gerçektir. Bunun yanında, uluslarası açıdan bakıldığında, 
hükümet seviyesinde bu konuda yayımlanmış tek standart, A.B.D. NIST 
(National Institute of Standarts and Technology) tarafından 25 Mayıs 2001 
tarihinde yayımlanan (09 Mart 2006 tarihinden itibaren ISO/IEC 19790 
olarak uluslararası nitelik kazanan) ve bir kriptografik modül tarafından 
karşılanması gereken güvenlik ihtiyaçlarını tanımlayan “Federal 
Information Standarts Publication (FIPS) 140-2” standardıdır.  
 
Devlete ait kritik kriptografik sistemlerle aktarılan kritik ve değerli 
verinin korunması çok öneme haiz olduğundan, bahse konu kriptografik 
sistemleri tanımlayan örnek bir şablon şartnamenin tanımlanması da o denli 
önemlidir.  
 
Bu çalışma kapsamında oluşturulan örnek şablon şartname, resmi 
kurum/kuruluşlar tarafından gerçekleştirilecek kriptografik sistem 
tedarikleri için bir başlangıç noktası ve insiyatif olmayı hedeflemektedir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Importance of The Study 
 
 
You  may not be able to see the end of the road clearly, if you travel on the 
cryptography highway. And nobody is being expected to help you. None of the crypto 
station sells a road map. The topic is always confidential and also not shareware. 
Retrospective studies have no sense, since none of the related works has one-to-one 
similarity with the one we have. And especially in Turkey, no publicly available study 
or information can be readily found.  
 
Besides all above, in many of the governmental organizations in Turkey, there is 
an increasing demand for using cryptographic modules in transmitting/transfering their 
sensitive data via computer or telecommunication systems. Although most of these 
organizations use COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) products in their private networks 
or intranets depending on the level of importance of their data, those COTS 
cryptographic products should better employed only in non-critical or less sensitive data 
transmits/transfers. In addition, since the capabilities (encryption power) of these COTS 
cryptographic systems are definite and limited, there is no need to prepare a technical 
specification to describe the minimum standarts and obligations. 
 
But, if our concern will be the critical cryptographic systems (sometimes life-
critical) which is subject to the very sensitive data like military data and high level 
political data, then we can not use neither, ordinary “COTS Cryptographic Products” 
commercially available to any one who pays the Money, nor “weak crypto” that can 
easily be imported.  
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In addition to that, COCOM (Coordinating Commitee for Multilateral Export 
Controls) Treaty (Turkey was a cooperating country), and the succesor Wassenaar 
Agreement (Turkey signed), which also have been regulating the export of 
cryptographic systems (hardware, software etc.), have a main goal “to prevent 
cryptography from being exported to dangerous countries like Libya, Iraq, Iran 
and North Korea” (WEB_1 2006). And since nobody can not guess the future of 
international political situation and the position of our country in that arena, we had 
better support “the national cryptology initiative” and the implementation of 
cryptographic systems/modules by national organizations or firms.  
 
Shortly, the demand for using cryptographic systems in both commercial and 
governmental institutions are increasing geometrically. And this is followed by 
procurement and by the technical specification/description needs and so on. So, this 
study is a unpretentious candidate to be a initiative and motivative one for the future 
work of “cryptographic module requirements”.  
 
 
1.2. Problem Description 
 
 
Due to the existence of following problems, “it is intended to work on defining 
a sample template technical specification which might be used for the procurement 
of cryptographic modules/systems (protecting sensitive and valuable data) by 
governmental organizations in Turkey”: 
  
a. Turkey, like most countries, leaves cryptography as yet unregulated or 
partially regulated. 
 
b. Failing international consensus after COCOM, Wassenaar Arrangement 
and OECD Principles, countries are thinking of taking steps on their own, driven by a 
growing concern for criminal crypto use (WEB_1 2006). 
 
 
 3
c. In Turkey, the “cryptology” is expected to be under the control of 
“Kriptoloji Dairesi Başkanlığı” with respect to the “draft” act “Ulusal Bilgi 
Güvenliği Teşkilatı ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı” (Başbakanlık 2000) and 
the regulations mentioned in the draft have no details to have an idea for the future work 
on the cryptography and cryptographic systems, and also on the specifications of 
cryptographic modules naturally. 
 
d. Even though FIPS 140-2 of NIST and the “ISO/IEC 19790:2006”, have 
been accepted as the international standarts on “Cryptographic Module 
Requirements” building to the FIPS 140-2 or ISO/IEC 19790:2006 standards is quite 
complicated. According to NIST, 48% of cryptographic modules submitted by new 
applicants and 20% of returning applicant modules contain security flaws. “A full 30% 
of algorithms tested by NIST do not conform to the FIPS Standard” (WEB_2 
2006). 
 
 
1.3. Solution Strategy 
 
 
To reach to the aim of the study and to form an optimum template specification 
as a proposed solution of the study, we successively needed to; 
• survey the international legal issues and legal issues in force in Turkey about 
the topic, 
• review whole methodology of FIPS 140-2 (or ISO/IEC 19790:2006) item by 
item, 
• review CMVP as a sub-topic for FIPS 140-2, 
• analyze the formerly used technical specifications of cryptographic modules 
for governmental organizations procurements and compare them with FIPS 
140-2 (or ISO/IEC 19790:2006), 
• review all related works which are limited (due to the confidentiality of the 
topic) numbers of white papers, articles and graduate theses, 
• evaluate and modify (if necessary) FIPS 140-2 context with respect to the 
related work and comparison conclusions,  
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• set up a sample template technical specification (in Turkish) and template 
matrix as an appendix to the study which consists of essential items (in text) 
needed for a technical specification of basic cryptographic module under the 
light of modified FIPS 140-2 context. 
 
 
1.4. The Appendices 
 
 
 The CD medium have been preferred due to lengthy nature of the outcomes of 
this research. Those five different products of this thesis come with the CD can be 
found on the inside of the back cover.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LEGAL ISSUES IN CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
 
2.1. International Conjuncture 
 
 
The export of cryptography has long been restricted. Evidently, governments 
have wanted to avoid strong cryptography from falling into the hands of foreign powers, 
which would have thwarted their ability to do the intelligence work. Cryptography has 
long been regarded as a weapon, and it is still featuring on lists that control the export of 
munitions. The main international agreement on export controls, the treaty of COCOM,
 
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, was replaced by the 
Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996 (WEB_1 2006). 
 
 
2.1.1. COCOM - The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls 
 
 
COCOM was an international organization for the mutual control of the export 
of strategic products and technical data from country members to defined destinations. 
It maintained, among others, the International Industrial List and the International 
Munitions List, regulating all kinds of cryptography. In 1989, COCOM decontrolled 
password and authentication-only cryptography. In 1991, COCOM decided to allow 
export of mass-market cryptographic software (including public-domain software). 
Most member countries of COCOM followed its regulations, but others, such as the 
United States, maintained separate regulations (WEB_1 2006). 
 
 
 
 6
The main goal of the COCOM regulations was to prevent cryptography from 
being exported to ‘dangerous’ countries – usually, the countries thought to maintain 
friendly ties with terrorists, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Exports to other 
countries were usually allowed, although states often required a license for these 
(WEB_1 2006). 
 
 
2.1.2. Wassenaar Arrangement 
 
 
COCOM was dissolved in March 1994. In 1995, 28 countries decided to 
establish a follow-up to COCOM, the “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls 
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies”. The negotiations 
on the treaty were finished in July 1996, and the agreement was signed by 33 countries 
(now 40 countries). Turkey was one of the signers. The Wassenaar Arrangement 
controls the export of weapons and of dual-use goods, that is, goods that can be used 
both for a military and for a civil purpose; cryptography is such a dual-use good. The 
provisions are largely the same as COCOM regulations. The General Software Note 
(GSN) excepts mass-market and public-domain crypto software from the controls; five 
countries (Australia, France, New Zealand, Russia, and the US) deviate from the GSN 
and control the export of mass-market and public-domain crypto software. Export via 
the Internet does not seem to be covered by the regulations. The Wassenaar 
Arrangement was scheduled to be revised in late 1998 (WEB_1 2006). 
 
In the Wassenaar Arrangement under DUAL-USE LIST-CATEGORY 4-
COMPUTERS sub-title it is stated that; computers, related equipment and "software" 
performing cryptographic, cryptanalytic, certifiable multi-level security or certifiable 
user isolation functions, or which limit electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), must also 
be evaluated against the performance characteristics in Category 5, Part 2 ("Information 
Security") (WEB_4 2006). 
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And succesively under DUAL-USE LIST-CATEGORY 5-PART 2- 
“INFORMATION SECURITY" (WEB_4 2006), it is stated that; items that meet all of 
the following shall not be controlled: 
• Generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from 
stock at retail selling points by means of any of the following:  
o Over-the-counter transactions. 
o Mail order transactions. 
o Electronic transactions or  
o Telephone call transactions;  
• The cryptographic functionality that cannot easily be changed by the user. 
• Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by 
the supplier and 
• Deleted. 
• When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, 
upon request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order 
to ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a. to c. 
above. 
 
And again DUAL-USE LIST-CATEGORY 5-PART 2- “INFORMATION 
SECURITY" (WEB_4 2006) does not control: 
• Personalised smart cards where the cryptographic capability is restricted 
for use in equipment or systems excluded from control under following 
items or for general public-use applications where the cryptographic 
capability is not user-accessible and it is specially designed and limited to 
allow protection of personal data stored within. 
• Receiving equipment for radio broadcast, pay television or similar 
restricted audience broadcast of the consumer type, without digital 
encryption except that exclusively used for sending the billing or 
programme-related information back to the broadcast providers. 
• Equipment where the cryptographic capability is not user-accessible and 
which is specially designed and limited to allow any of the following:  
o Execution of copy-protected software. 
o Access to any of the following:  
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 Copy-protected contents stored on read-only media. 
 Information stored in encrypted form on media (e.g. in 
connection with the protection of intellectual property rights) 
when the media is offered for sale in identical sets to the public;  
o Copying control of copyright protected audio/video data. 
o Encryption and/or decryption for protection of libraries, design 
attributes or associated data for the design of semiconductor devices 
or integrated circuits. 
• Cryptographic equipment specially designed and limited for banking use 
or money transactions. 
• Portable or mobile radiotelephones for civil use (e.g., for use with 
commercial civil cellular radiocommunications systems) that are not 
capable of end-to-end encryption. 
• Cordless telephone equipment not capable of end-to-end encryption where 
the maximum effective range of unboosted cordless operation (i.e., a 
single, unrelayed hop between terminal and home basestation) is less than 
400 meters according to the manufacturer's specifications.  
 
 
2.1.3. OECD Crypto Policy 
 
 
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) have 
developed “guidelines” for a crypto policy, after extensive discussions throughout 1996. 
The OECD started discussing and drafting policy guidelines in December 1995 with an 
Ad-hoc Meeting of Experts on Cryptography Policy. The guidelines were discussed and 
revised in several meetings in 1996, leading to the adoption of the “Recommendation 
of the Council concerning Guidelines for Cryptography Policy” on 27 March 1997. 
The guidelines are non-binding recommendations to Member governments, meaning 
that they are not part of international law. The guidelines provide principles which 
states should take into account and balance in developing a national crypto policy 
(WEB_1 2006). 
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The principles (WEB_1 2006) are:  
• Trust in cryptographic methods: market forces and government regulation 
should foster user trust in cryptographic methods. 
• Choice of cryptographic methods: users should have the right to choose 
any cryptographic method, subject to applicable law. 
• Market-driven development of cryptographic methods: the market 
should determine the development and provision of cryptographic methods, 
including international standards. 
• Standards for cryptographic methods: international and interoperable 
standards for cryptographic methods should be developed; national standards 
should be consistent with international ones. 
• Protection of privacy and personal data: national cryptography policies 
and the implementation and use of cryptographic methods should respect the 
fundamental rights of individuals to privacy, including secrecy of 
communications and protection of personal data. 
• Lawful access: national cryptography policies may allow lawful access to 
plaintext or cryptographic keys. 
• Liability: the liability of crypto users and of crypto service providers should 
be clearly stated. 
• International cooperation: governments should cooperate to coordinate 
cryptography policies; governments should remove, or avoid creating, 
unjustified obstacles to trade.  
 
The principles should be seen as “interdependent and should be implemented 
as a whole so as to balance the various interests at stake. No principle should be 
implemented in isolation from the rest” (WEB_1 2006). The balance basically has to 
be struck between the first five (crypto-friendly) principles and the sixth (policy-
friendly) principle, lawful access. This crucial and most controversial principle reads: 
“National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plaintext, or cryptographic 
keys, of encrypted data. These policies must respect the other principles contained in the 
guidelines to the greatest extent possible.” Interestingly, the most crypto-friendly 
principle, free choice, was adapted at the final stage. Where the earlier version read that 
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crypto users should have a right to choose any crypto method, this was extended with 
the restriction “subject to applicable law”, thus opening the door for a prohibition of 
cryptography (WEB_1 2006). 
 
 
2.1.4. General Evaluation 
 
 
The world wide survey of cryptography laws show that regulations differ 
widely. Some countries have implicitly prohibited cryptography (Russia, France). 
Others are looking at leaky solutions (in particular the US and the UK), but they face 
fierce opposition by their citizens. Moreover, other countries and the European 
Commission are wary of this approach. Some countries are looking at commanding 
people to decrypt as a solution. The Netherlands has enacted a law to that effect, which 
is currently under revision to enable the police to give a decryption command in more 
situations. Most countries leave cryptography as yet unregulated – if not by a conscious 
decision, then at least by a failure to develop a viable and broadly supported policy. The 
complexity of developing an acceptable crypto policy is also reflected in the 
international talks on the subject. After the failure of the OECD guidelines to steer 
international crypto policies, there is little hope that there will be an international or 
supranational agreement on addressing the crypto problem within the foreseeable future 
(WEB_1 2006). 
 
Failing international consensus, countries are thinking of taking steps on their 
own, driven by a growing concern for criminal crypto use. However, most governments 
are confused over the direction of a policy, and they seem to be looking at other 
countries to see what the emerging international direction will be. So, there is a general 
impasse in the cryptocontroversy debate (WEB_1 2006).  
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2.2. Legal Situation of Cryptography in Turkey 
 
 
In Turkey, the “cryptology” (and also cryptography) will be under the control of 
“Kriptoloji Dairesi Başkanlığı” with respect to the “draft” act “Ulusal Bilgi 
Güvenliği Teşkilatı ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun Tasarısı Taslağı” (Başbakanlık 
2000). And the regulations mentioned in the draft has no detail and far from explaining 
to have an idea for the future work on the cryptography and cryptographic systems, and 
also on the specifications of cryptographic modules naturally. The responsibilities of 
“Kriptoloji Dairesi Başkanlığı” (Başbakanlık 2000) with respect to the draft regulations 
are to: 
• determine the need for cryptographic algorithms and inspect the production 
and establish the library. 
• specify the principles and methods for the export and import of the 
cryptographic modules/information by coordinating with Turkish General 
Staff, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other concerning government 
departments, and license. 
• establish risk analysis and risk mitigation plans, to determine the acceptable 
risk. 
• specify the criteria which should be provided by crypto centers and the 
methods and principles of inspections.  
• approve the crypto center by evaluating the inspection reports.  
• generate and distribute the cryptographic keys. 
• license the official agencies for generating and distributing their own 
cryptographic keys in case of necessity. 
• specify the utilization principles of cryptography in unclassified applications, 
and to encourage and inspect them. 
• specify the crypto bookkeeping, operating, maintanence and repair methods 
for cryptographic modules and documentation. 
• specify and take the required precautions against cryptographic violations.  
• specify the certification and approval methods for every kind of 
cryptographic method and module. 
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• specify the principles and methods of cryptographic licensing for the 
personnel under the crypto services. 
 
As mentioned above, there is no frame act in force on cryptology in Turkey. In 
the absence of execution in this area, some governmental institutions like Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) have taken the 
responsibilities.  
  
Licensing the individuals and establishments who build or use cryptographic 
software and hardware which are required for defense systems, utilization of these 
systems and techniques for communication or transmission of any 
information/documentation, the request and specifications by administration and the 
rules that must be obeyed by the individuals and establishments, other execution 
principles and methods, all shall be explained in the specific directive that will be issued 
by MoD. Until that time all related activities shall be carried out by Turkish General 
Staff (TGS) (MSB 2003a). However, the procurement activities for cryptographic 
modules are stil carried out by MoD.  
 
And for this kind of R&D required products one of the following “single source 
procurement” method is used with the countenance of Deputy MoD and approval of 
Minister of Defence (MSB 2006): 
• The procurements for which the requirements are determined to be able to be 
provided only by factual or judicial single person. 
• The procurements for which only a factual or judicial single person has a 
specific right for providing the requirements.  
 
Cryptographic systems has defined under “Obligatorily National Systems/ 
Technologies” (for long term they should certainly be implemented or supplied in the 
country) and “Critical Systems/ Technologies” (for long term aiming to implement in 
the country or otherwise anticipated as joint production) (MSB 2003b). 
 
For all kind of procurement activities (also for cryptographic modules) in MoD, 
“M.S.B. Teknik Şartname Hizmetleri Yönergesi (MSY.: 202-12 (B))” is the only 
valid legal document to be used.  
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2.3. Current Practice in Turkey 
 
 
Government as being the only customer and TÜBİTAK-UEKAE as the only 
qualified vendor are currently carrying out all cryptographic activities including module 
design, implementation, production and testing. And TÜBİTAK/UEKAE proclaims 
(WEB_3 2006) that they carry out: 
• cryptographic designs including key management and production protocols, 
symmetric keyed algorithms, cryptographic systems with public key, 
authentication protocols, 
• tests and evaluations including cryptographic security tests, auditing with 
respect to IEEE, ANSI, ISO, FIPS standarts, NIST tests, COMSEC test and 
evaluations. 
• EMC and TEMPEST tests. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION 
 
 
3.1. FIPS 140-2 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules. 
 
 
FIPS 140-2 is a NIST standard to be used by (US) Federal organizations when 
specifying cryptographic-based security systems to provide protection for sensitive or 
valuable data (maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of information). The FIPS 
140 standard specifies the security requirements to be satisfied by a cryptographic 
module in four increasing, qualitative levels of security (Level 1 to 4, from low to high) 
as summarized in the following:  
 
● Security Level 1 provides the lowest level of security. It specifies basic 
security requirements for a cryptographic module (for software implementation only). 
●  Security Level 2 improves the physical security of a Security Level 1 
cryptographic module by adding the requirement for tamper evident coatings or seals, or 
for pick-resistant locks. 
●  Security Level 3 requires enhanced physical security, attempting to prevent 
the intruder from gaining access to critical security parameters held within the module. 
●  Security Level 4 provides the highest level of security. Level 4 physical 
security provides an envelope of protection around the cryptographic module to detect a 
penetration of the device from any direction (WEB_2 2006).  
 
These levels are intended to cover the wide range of potential applications and 
environments in which cryptographic modules may be employed. The security 
requirements cover eleven areas related to the secure design and implementation of the 
cryptographic module. These areas include the following: cryptographic module 
specification; cryptographic module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and 
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authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; 
cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMI/ EMC); self tests; design assurance and mitigation of other attacks 
(WEB_2 2006).  
 
The security requirements specified in FIPS 140-2 relate to the secure design 
and implementation of a cryptographic module. The requirements are derived from the 
following high-level functional security objectives for a cryptographic module:  
 
• to employ and correctly implement the Approved security functions for the 
protection of sensitive information. 
• to protect a cryptographic module from unauthorized operation or use. 
• to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the contents of the cryptographic 
module, including plaintext cryptographic keys and CSPs. 
• to prevent the unauthorized and undetected modification of the 
cryptographic module and cryptographic algorithms, including the 
unauthorized modification, substitution, insertion, and deletion of 
cryptographic keys and CSPs. 
• to provide indications of the operational state of the cryptographic module. 
• to ensure that the cryptographic module performs properly when operating in 
an Approved mode of operation. 
• to detect errors in the operation of the cryptographic module and to prevent 
the compromise of sensitive data and CSPs resulting from these errors. 
 
The FIPS 140 standard is reexamined or reaffirmed in every five years. FIPS 
140-1 standard specifies the security requirements to be satisfied by a cryptographic 
module used within a security system protecting unclassified information within 
computer and telecommunications systems (including voice systems). FIPS 140-2 
superseded FIPS 140-1 in 2001 with technical modifications to address technological 
advances that had occurred since FIPS 140-1 had been issued (WEB_2 2006).  
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3.1.1. Challenges in FIPS 140-2 Validation 
 
 
Moreover, building to the FIPS 140-2 standard is complicated. According to 
NIST, 48% of cryptographic modules submitted by new applicants and 20% of 
returning applicant modules contain security flaws. “A full 30% of algorithms tested 
by NIST do not conform to the FIPS Standard”. So vendors can spend time and 
money developing a solution that requires FIPS validation for the government market, 
then submit it to a testing process that can take months and afterwards learn that their 
solution is flawed and cannot be FIPS-Validated without improvements. Other 
challenges that point towards the need for an easier solution (WEB_2 2006) include: 
• Increased need for in-house security expertise. 
• Evolving FIPS standards that require continuous monitoring. 
• Platform specificity of each FIPS validation. 
• Requirement for re-validation when any feature changes are introduced into  
FIPS Validated product.  
 
FIPS validation provides third-party verification that the secure technologies 
used by government agencies meet a predetermined security profile. NIST has 
accredited twelve (currently) third-party labs to test vendor products and technologies 
for FIPS validation but high demand combined with the thorough testing process results 
in lengthy waiting periods that can be up to a year (WEB_2 2006). This validation 
process is called “Cryptographic Module Validation Program” and will be mentioned in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
At the beginning of this study FIPS 140-2 of NIST had been evaluated as “Final 
Committee Document” for ISO standard and ultimately has been accepted as ISO 
standart with “ISO/IEC 19790:2006” for “Cryptographic Module Requirements” on 
March 1, 2006.  
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3.2. CMVP - Cryptographic Module Validation Program. 
 
To receive FIPS 140-2 validation, a cryptographic module must: 
• Have a well-defined crypto boundary so that all sensitive security 
information remains within the cryptographic core of the product. 
• Use at least one FIPS-approved algorithm with correct implementation and 
an intact crypto boundary. 
The FIPS module must be validated through the “Cryptographic Module 
Validation Program (CMVP)” (WEB_2 2006). On July 17, 1995, the NIST 
established the CMVP that validates cryptographic modules to Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-1 “Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules”, and other FIPS cryptography based standards. The CMVP is a joint effort 
between NIST and the CSE of the Government of Canada. FIPS 140-2 was released on 
May 25, 2001 and superceded FIPS 140-1. However, agencies may continue to 
purchase, retain and use FIPS 140-1 validated products after May 25, 2002. Modules 
validated as conforming to FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 are accepted by the Federal 
Agencies of both countries for the protection of sensitive information. Vendors of 
cryptographic modules use independent, accredited Cryptographic Module Testing 
(CMT) laboratories to test their modules. The CMT laboratories use the “Derived Test 
Requirements [DTR] for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules and Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and 
the Cryptographic Module Validation Program” to test cryptographic modules 
against FIPS 140-2. NIST’s Computer Security Division and CSE jointly serve as the 
Validation Authorities for the program, validating the test results. Shown below in 
Figure 1 is a summary of the CMV process (WEB_5 2006):  
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Figure 1: General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation. 
(Source: FAQs for the CMVP, NIST&CSE, May 20, 2005) 
 
The CMVP can be applied to any government department, although it is only 
current formally accepted by the U.S., Canadian, and U.K. governments only for the 
time being. Currently, several Common Criteria (CC) Protection Profiles (PP) require 
FIPS 140-1 and 140-2 validated cryptographic modules. These PPs have been 
developed by many organizations throughout the world. Using FIPS 140-2 validated 
cryptographic modules will ensure that the product has implemented the FIPS 
approved/NIST recommended cryptography correctly (WEB_5 2006). 
 
The role of the CMT Laboratories is to test the cryptographic module against all 
applicable requirements as specified in FIPS 140-2 and in the cryptographic algorithm 
standards and record the results. If a cryptographic module conforms to all the 
functional and assurance requirements as stated in the “Derived Test Requirements 
(DTR)”, the CMT laboratory submits a written report to the Validation Authorities. If a 
cryptographic module does not meet one (or more) requirements, the CMT Laboratory 
will work with the vendor to resolve all discrepancies prior to resubmitting the 
validation package to the Validation Authorities (WEB_5 2006).  
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Typically, for cryptographic algorithms, the CMT laboratory generates test 
vectors based on information provided by the vendor. The CMT laboratory and the 
vendor use test vectors to exercise the cryptographic algorithm implementation. The 
vendor submits test results to the CMT laboratory and the laboratory verifies that the 
results are accurate (WEB_5 2006). 
 
The testing process duration depends on the cryptographic module being tested. 
The time depends on a variety of factors including: the complexity of the cryptographic 
module, the overall Security Level, individual Security Levels (if higher than the overall 
Security Level), the current lab workload, and the content and quality of the vendor 
documentation submitted with the cryptographic module (WEB_5 2006). 
 
To test cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-2, “Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules”, and cryptographic algorithm standards, CMT laboratories 
become an accredited CMT laboratory under either National Validation Laboratory 
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) or Standards Council of Canada (SCC). All CMT 
laboratories are currently accredited by NVLAP. In Canada, SCC is preparing a CMT 
laboratory accreditation process under the Program for Accreditation of Laboratories – 
Canada (PALCAN). PALCAN will support the review of the Quality System with 
technical assistance from the CMVP staff (WEB_5 2006). 
 
A cryptographic module does not meet the requirements or conform to the FIPS 
140-1 or FIPS 140-2 standard unless a reference can be made to the validation 
certificate number obtained by CMVP. The module used must also be the same 
version/part number as annotated on the validation certificate. Any other claims are not 
relevant (WEB_5 2006). 
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3.3. Related Studies 
 
 
 Due to confidentiality of the topic, it is not easy to find/survey previous studies 
related to what is proposed in this study in Turkey. In the following paragraphs we shall 
mention about some related studies that have additional and beneficial information 
(beyond FIPS 140-2) for the set up of our template technical specification for the 
cryptographic  modules, anyhow. 
 
 
3.3.1. Case Study # 1 
 
 
The study entitled “Side-Channel Attacks:Ten Years After Its Publication 
and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing” by YongBin Zhou and 
DengGuo Feng, denotes that side-channel attacks are easy-to-implement whilst 
powerful attacks against cryptographic implementations, and their targets range from 
primitives, protocols, modules, and devices to even systems. These attacks pose a 
serious threat to the security of cryptographic modules. In consequence, cryptographic 
implementations have to be evaluated for their resistivity against such attacks and the 
incorporation of different countermeasures has to be considered. This study surveys the 
methods and techniques employed in these attacks, the destructive effects of such 
attacks, the countermeasures against such attacks and evaluation of their feasibility and 
applicability. Finally, the necessity and feasibility of adopting this kind of physical 
security testing and evaluation in the development of FIPS 140-3 standard are explored 
(WEB_6 2006).  
 
Actually, there are some problems with the current version of FIPS 140-2. First 
of all, this version of standard is mainly focused on “hardware modules”, and is not 
well adapted to software modules. It is expected this status may change in the coming 
version of FIPS 140-3. Secondly, this version of standard covers somewhat too narrow 
scopes of the system to be tested. Better alignment with the “Common Criteria” is 
required, and the security vulnerabilities of functional protocols need to be addressed 
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better. Finally, the functional requirements of this version of FIPS 140-2 are already 
out-of-date. The requirements specified in FIPS 140-2 have lagged behind the actual 
needs of the information security both in theory and practice (WEB_6 2006). 
 
Meanwhile, the complex process of FIPS 140-2 validation shows that excellence 
in creating solid cryptographic algorithms and modules is difficult to achieve. Of the 
eleven areas, the following four areas are likely of greatest difficulty: “physical 
security, self-tests, random number generation and key management” (WEB_6 
2006). 
 
Specifically, as far as Side-Channel Attack (SCA) is concerned, FIPS 140-1 did 
not explicitly mention the security of cryptographic modules against side channel 
attacks, while FIPS 140-2 only deal briefly with the specification of mitigation of 
attacks for which no testable requirements are currently available.  The most common 
and known SCAs with some details (WEB_6 2006) are: 
 
• Timing Attack: Implementations of cryptographic algorithms often perform 
computations in non-constant time, due to performance optimizations. If 
such operations involve secret parameters, these timing variations can leak 
some information and, provided enough knowledge of the implementation is 
at hand, a careful statistical analysis could even lead to the total recovery of 
these secret parameters. A timing attack is, essentially, a way of obtaining 
some user's private information by carefully measuring the time it takes the 
user to carry out cryptographic operations. The principle of this attack is 
very simple: to exploit the timing variance in the operation. Two common 
countermeasures that are currently in use (i.e. noise injection and branch 
equalization) appear to be fundamentally different in the sense that noise 
injection weakens the power of the timing attack but it does not defeat it, 
whereas branch equalisation does defeat the attack but at significant cost.  
 
• Fault Attack: Most of the devices that perform various cryptographic 
operations are usually assumed to operate reliably when we use them, so we 
might not think to question if the security of such operations depend on the 
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reliability of these devices that implement them. In spite of this assumption, 
hardware faults and errors occurring during the operation of a cryptographic 
module in fact have been demonstrated to seriously affect the security. These 
faulty behaviors or outputs may also become important side channels, and 
will even greatly increase a cipher’s vulnerability to cryptanalysis 
sometimes. Generally speaking, a successful fault attack on cryptographic 
modules or devices requires two steps: the fault injection and the fault 
exploitation steps. If we suppose that an attacker cannot induce the same 
fault twice, one of the best countermeasures to protect the symmetric 
algorithms such DES and AES is to compute the whole or a part of the 
rounds twice (including key scheduling). Another countermeasure suggested 
to protect public key algorithms from some specific fault attacks is to check 
the integrity of the secret key at the end of signature computation.  
 
• Power Analysis Attack: In addition to its running time and its faulty 
behaviour, the power consumption of a cryptographic device may provide 
much information about the operations that take place and the involved 
parameters. This is the very idea of power analysis attack. Certainly, power 
analysis attack is applicable only to hardware implementation of the 
cryptosystems.  
 
Power analysis attack is particularly effective and proven successful 
in attacking smart cards or other dedicated embedded systems storing the 
secret key. Basically, power analysis attack can be divided into Simple and 
Differential Power Analysis (referred to as SPA and DPA, respectively). In 
SPA attacks, the aim is essentially to guess from the power trace which 
particular instruction is being executed at a certain time and what values the 
input and output have. Therefore, the adversary needs an exact knowledge of 
the implementation to mount such an attack. On the other hand, DPA attack 
does not need the knowledge of the implementation details and alternatively 
exploiting statistical methods in the analysis process.  
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Proposals for hardware-based defenses against power analysis attacks 
include using an internal power source, randomizing the order in which 
instructions are executed, randomized register renaming, and using two 
capacitors, one of which is charged by an external power supply and the 
other supplies power to the device. One effective method for guarding 
against SPA attacks on point multiplication is to employ elliptic curve 
addition formulas that can also be used for doubling.  
 
Defenses against differential power analysis are difficult, since they 
essentially only reduce the signal the adversary is reading, rather than 
eliminate it. Interestingly, an efficient randomization technique, using some 
random variables within the point addition operation, has also been proposed 
as a possible countermeasure against a DPA-style attack on the window-
family algorithm in.  
 
• EM Attack: As electrical devices, the components of a computer often 
generate electromagnetic radiation as part of their operation. An adversary 
that can observe these emanations and can understand their causal 
relationship to the underlying computation and data may be able to infer a 
surprising amount of information about this computation and data. This 
ability can be devastating, should the computer be a trusted computing 
platform intended to keep this information from the adversary. Similar to the 
power analysis attacks, ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA) attacks can also be 
divided into two main categories: Simple ElectroMagnetic Analysis (SEMA) 
and Differential ElectroMagnetic Analysis (DEMA). Countermeasures 
against EM attacks on specific implementations fall into two broad 
categories: signal strength reduction and signal information reduction. 
Techniques for signal strength reduction include circuit redesign to reduce 
unintentional emanations and the use of shielding and physically secured 
zones to reduce the strength of compromising signals available to an 
adversary relative to ambient thermal noise. Techniques for signal 
information reduction rely on the use of randomization and/or frequent key 
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refreshing within the computation so as to substantially reduce the 
effectiveness of statistical attacks using the available signals.  
 
• Acoustic Attack : Most side-channel attack research has focused on 
electromagnetic emanations (TEMPEST), power consumption and, recently, 
diffuse visible light from CRT displays. However, one of the oldest 
eavesdropping channels, namely acoustic emanations, has received little 
attention. Very recently, Shamir have demonstrated a preliminary proof-of-
concept that a correlation exists between the sound of a processor and its 
computation. One may consider the approach the P. Wright used in 1965 is 
likely one of the primitive acoustic attacks. However, this is a relatively new 
field, and much work needs to be done.  
 
• Visible Light Attack : Kuhn demonstrated (via both sophisticated analysis 
as well as direct experiment) that the average luminosity of a CRT’s diffuse 
reflection off of a wall can sufficient to reconstruct the signal displayed on 
the CRT (so shielding the CRT to protect against leaking information via 
electromagnetic radiation may not be sufficient). One outstanding 
characteristic of this attack is that physical access is not required. 
 
• Error Message Attack : In many standards, e.g. SSL/TLS, IPSEC, WTLS, 
messages are first pre-formatted, then encrypted in CBC mode with a block 
cipher. Decryption needs to check if the format is valid. Validity of the 
format is easily leaked from communication protocols in a chosen ciphertext 
attack since the receiver usually sends an acknowledgment or an error 
message. This can become a useful side channel for cryptanalysis and the 
attack exploiting this side channel is often called error message attack. 
 
• Cache-based Attack : Previously proposed timing attacks make use of the 
fact that conditional branches that occur during encryption processing cause 
variations in encryption time. CPU cache misses, however, can also cause 
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such variations. In this regard, most of the recent computers employ a CPU 
cache, abbreviated simple to a cache from here on, between the CPU and 
main memory, since this type of hierarchical structure can speed program 
run-time on the average. If, however, the CPU accesses data that were not 
stored in the cache, i.e. if a cache miss occurs, a delay will be generated, as 
the target data must be loaded from main memory into the cache. The 
measurement of this delay may enable attackers to determine the occurrence 
and frequency of cache misses. This is where the cache-based side channel 
attacks goes. A number of countermeasures to mitigate the cached-based 
attacks have been proposed, to name a few, to remove cache or cached S-box 
access, to disable cache flushing, to perform time and miss skewings, to use 
application-specific algorithmic masking, to depend on operating system 
support, to adopt partitioned cache hardware architecture, and so on.  
 
• Frequency-based Attack : C.C. Liu proposed a frequency-based side 
channel attack against mobile devices such as PDAs, cell phones and pagers. 
His method is efficient even when traces are misaligned in actual attacking 
experiments, whereas the previously researched DEMA fails in such 
condition. In addition, the proposed first-order frequency attack is capable of 
defeating the desynchronization countermeasure that randomly inserts 
delays. However, it may be a pity that the countermeasures against this kind 
of frequency-based attack are not addressed. 
 
• Scan-based Attack : Scan based test is a powerful test technique. However, 
it is an equally powerful attack tool. In 2004, Yang used scan chains as a 
side channel to recover secret keys from a hardware implementation of DES. 
By using one build-in self-test scheme, the internal status of cryptographic 
chips will not be scanned out and such scan based attacks can be avoided. 
Luckily enough, this kind of self-test is already recommended by FIPS 140-2 
be the physical security requirement of cryptographic chips. However, it is 
pointed out here that the high fault coverage of scan based test makes 
developing a secure scan based solution to cryptographic chips interesting.  
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Besides the current security testing requirements, the requirements of standard 
FIPS 140-2 should be extended to a larger scale and to cover the following aspects like 
side channels mentioned above: “analysis of cryptographic protocols”; “analysis of 
effectiveness of key management”; “analysis of correct use of the cryptographic 
module in a larger product”; “any statements about non-FIPS approved or FIPS 
allowed algorithms”; and so on (WEB_6 2006). The topics on “analysis of correct use 
of the cryptographic module in a larger product” and “any statements about non-FIPS 
approved or FIPS allowed algorithms” are out of concern in this study, but, it is thought 
that is essential to explain “analysis of cryptographic protocols” and “analysis of 
effectiveness of key management” aspects briefly in the following paragraphs due to the 
importance for the study.  
 
 
3.3.1.1.Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols  
 
 
Analyzing the cryptographic protocols needs to test “secrecy” (the adversary 
cannot obtain the secret), “authentication” and “strong secrecy” (the adversary does not 
see the difference when the value of the secret changes) features of the cryptographic 
protocol. And the most common and effective methods for analyzing and documenting 
the cryptographic protocol operations, according to their operation domain, are 
(Gritzalis and Spinellis 1997): “Inference-construction”, “Attack-construction” and 
“Proof-construction”.    
 
• Inference-construction: Inference analysis is a class of analyses that builds 
a framework of modal logic around properties such as knowledge and beliefs 
of the participants in a protocol. The first logic system for protocol analysis 
was the so-called BAN logic devised by Burrows, Abadi and Needham . It 
assumes that authentication is a function of integrity and freshness, and uses 
logical rules to trace both of those attributes through the protocol. There are 
three main stages for the analysis of a protocol using BAN logic. The first 
step is to express the assumptions and goals as statements in a symbolic 
notation so that the logic can proceed from a known state to one where it can 
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ascertain whether the goals are in fact reached. The second step is to 
transform the protocol steps into symbolic notation. Finally, a set of 
deduction rules called postulates are applied. The postulates should lead 
from the assumptions, via intermediate formulas, to the authentication goals. 
The BAN logic has been extended in, amongst others, GNY and SvO. 
Inference analysis of cryptographic protocol has shown to be a success 
(Lukell and Hutchison 2003). 
 
• Attack-construction: As the name indicates, this kind of methods construct 
probable attack sets based on the algebraic properties of the protocol’s 
algorithms. Examples of such methods are the NRL Protocol Analyzer, and 
Lowe’s method of using the FDR model checker. These methods are 
targeted towards ensuring authentication, correctness or secrecy properties of 
the analysed protocols. Their disadvantage lies in the big number of possible 
events that must be examined, also referred to the state space explosion 
problem. However, various optimisation techniques exist that limit the 
search space to a manageable size. Furthermore, in combination with the 
development of more powerful computer systems, this approach has shown 
to be viable for modelled systems of a reasonable size (Lukell and Hutchison 
2003). 
 
• Proof Construction: Attempts to avoid the exponential searches of attack 
construction, and to extend analyses that involve arbitrarily large numbers of 
participants and messages, has given rise to the proof construction approach 
for the analysis of protocol failures. It has the potential of being as thorough 
as attack construction in proving possible attacks, while avoiding 
exponential searches by replacing them with theorems about these searches. 
This method is completely general, with the disadvantage that it typically 
requires significant human insight and guidance (Lukell and Hutchison 
2003). 
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3.3.1.2.Analysis of Effectiveness of Key Management  
 
 
Key management is often an afterthought in the cryptographic development 
process. As a result, cryptographic subsystems too often fail to support the key 
management functionality and protocols that are necessary to provide adequate security 
with the minimum necessary reduction in operational efficiency. But, there is no testing 
method avaliable for “Key Management” currently, since FIPS 171 “Key Management 
Using ANSI X9.17” is withdrawn by NIST on February 8, 2005 due to withdrawal of 
X9.17 by ANSI. But “Recommendation for Key Management Guideline- Part 
1:General” has been approved by NIST as “NIST Special Publication 800-57” in 
August 2005. This first part is quite informative and provides initiative for the rest of 
the “Key Management”.To summarize the Part 1:General (NIST 2005): 
 
• All cryptographic development activities should involve key management 
planning and specification by those managers responsible for the secure 
implementation of cryptography into an information system. 
 
• Key management planning should begin during the initial 
conceptual/development stages of the cryptographic development lifecycle, 
or during the initial discussion stages for the application of existing 
cryptographic components into information systems and networks.  
 
• For cryptographic development efforts, a key specification and acquisition 
planning process should begin as soon as the candidate algorithm(s) and, if 
appropriate, keying material medium and format have been identified. 
 
• For the application of existing cryptographic products for which no key 
management specification exists, the planning and specification processes 
should begin during device and source selection and continue through 
acquisition and installation. 
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• Key Management Specification Description/Purpose : The Key 
Management Specification is the document that describes the key 
management components that may be required to operate a cryptographic 
device throughout its lifetime. 
 
• Content of the Key Management Specification : The Key Management 
Specification should contain a title page that includes the device identifier, 
and the developer’s or integrator’s identifier. A revision page, list of 
reference documents, table of contents, and definition of abbreviations and 
acronyms page should also normally be included. 
 
• Cryptographic Application : The Cryptographic Application section 
provides a brief description of the cryptographic application or proposed 
employment of the cryptographic device. This includes the purpose or use of 
the cryptographic device (or application of a cryptographic device), and 
whether it is a new cryptographic device, a modification of an existing 
cryptographic device, or an existing cryptographic device for which a Key 
Management Specification does not exist. A brief description of the security 
services (confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, 
identification and authentication, and availability) that the cryptographic 
device/application provides should be included. Information concerning 
longterm and potential interim key management support (key management 
components) for the cryptographic application should be provided. 
 
• Communications Environment : The Communications Environment 
section provides a brief description of the communications environment (like 
data networks (intranet, internet, VPN)) in which the cryptographic device is 
designed to operate.  
 
• Key Management Component Requirements : The key management 
component requirements section describes the types and logical structure of 
keying material required for operation of the cryptographic device. 
Cryptographic applications using public key certificates (i.e., X.509 
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certificates) should describe the types of certificates supported. The 
following information should be included: 
 
o The different keying material classes or types required, supported, and/or 
generated (e.g., for PKI: CA, signature, key establishment, and 
authentication). 
 
o The key management algorithm(s) (the applicable FIPS). 
 
o The keying material format(s) (reference any existing key specification if 
known). 
 
o The set of acceptable PKI policies (as applicable). 
 
o Tokens to be used. 
 
• Key Management Component Generation : This section of the Key 
Management Specification should describe requirements for the generation 
of key management components by the cryptographic device for which the 
Key Management Specification is written. 
 
• Key Management Component Distribution : Where a device supports the 
automated distribution of keying material, this section of the Key 
Management Specification should describe the distribution and transport 
encapsulation (where employed) of keying material supported by the device. 
 
• Keying Material Storage : This section of the Key Management 
Specification should address how the cryptographic device or application for 
which the Key Management Specification is being written stores 
information, and how the keying material is identified during its storage life 
(e.g., Distinguished  Name). The storage capacity capabilities for 
information should be included. 
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• Access Control : This section of the Key Management Specification should 
address how access to the cryptographic device components and functions is 
to be authorized, controlled, and validated to request, generate, handle, 
distribute, store, and/or use keying material. Any use of passwords and 
personal identification numbers (PINs) should be included. For PKI 
cryptographic  applications, role-based privileging and the use of tokens 
should be described. 
 
• Accounting : This section of the Key Management Specification should 
describe any device or application support for accounting for keying 
material. Any support for or outputs to logs used to support the tracking of 
key management component generation, distribution, storage, use and/or 
destruction should be detailed. The use of appropriate privileging to support 
the control of keying material that is used by the cryptographic application 
should also be described, in addition to the directory capabilities used to 
support PKI cryptographic applications, if applicable. The Key Management 
Specification shall identify where human and automated tracking actions are 
required and where two-person integrity is required, if applicable. 
 
• Compromise Management and Recovery : This section of the Key 
Management Specification should address any support for the restoration of 
protected communications in the event of the compromise of keying material 
used by the cryptographic device/application. The recovery process 
description should include the methods for re-keying.  
 
• Key Recovery : This section of the Key Management Specification 
describes product support or system mechanisms for effecting key recovery. 
Key recovery addresses how unavailable encryption keys can be recovered. 
System developers should include a discussion of the generation, storage, 
and access for long-term storage keys in the key recovery process 
description. The process of transitioning from the current to future long-term 
storage keys should also be included.  
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3.3.2. Case Study # 2 
 
 
The study entitled “Some Basic Cryptographic Requirements for Chaos-
Based Cryptosystems” by Gonzalo Alvarez and Shujun Li, denotes that many 
proposed systems are difficult to implement in practice with a reasonable degree of 
security. Likewise, they are seldom accompanied by a thorough security analysis. 
Consequently, it is difficult for other researchers and end users to evaluate their security 
and performance. In this study it is intended to provide a common framework of basic 
guidelines that, if followed, every new cryptosystem would benefit from. The suggested 
guidelines address three main issues: implementation, key management, and security 
analysis, aiming at assisting designers of new cryptosystems to present their work in a 
more systematic and rigorous way to fulfill some basic cryptographic requirements 
(Alvarez and Li 2006). 
 
 
3.3.3. Case Study # 3 
 
 
The study entitled “Cryptographic Processors-A Survey” by Ross Anderson, 
Mike Bond, Jolyon Clulow and Sergei Skorobogatov, denotes that one response is to 
look for evaluations by third parties. There are two schemes under which 
cryptoprocessors are certified FIPS 140, run by the US National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, and the Common Criteria, operated by a number of member countries. 
Both have drawbacks. FIPS looks only at the tamperresistance of the hardware. A FIPS 
evaluation, especially at level 4, is nonetheless of value to the discerning customer 
(Anderson et al. 2006). 
 
 
3.3.4. Case Study # 4 
 
The study entitled “An Open-source Cryptographic Coprocessor” by Peter 
Gutmann explains that current crypto implementations rely on software running under 
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general-purpose operating systems alongside a horde of untrusted applications, ActiveX 
controls, web browser plugins, mailers handling messages with embedded active 
content, and numerous other threats to security, with only the OS’s (often almost 
nonexistant) security to keep the two apart. The study also presents a general-purpose 
open-source crypto coprocessor capable of securely performing crypto operations such 
as key management, certificate creation and handling, and e-mail encryption, 
decryption, and signing, at a cost one to two orders of magnitude below that of 
commercial equivalents while providing generally equivalent performance and a higher 
level of functionality. The study examines various issues involved in designing the 
coprocessor, and explores options for hardware acceleration of crypto operations for 
extended performance above and beyond that offered by the basic coprocessor’s COTS 
hardware (Gutmann 2000). 
 
 
3.3.5. Case Study # 5 
 
 
The study entitled “The Design and Verification of a Cryptographic Security 
Architecture” by Peter Gutmann again, denotes, in  Chapter 2 Security Architecture, 
when building a secure system for cryptographic use, there are two possible approaches 
which can be taken. The first is to build (or buy) a general-purpose kernel-based secure 
operating system and run the crypto code on top of it, and the second is to build a 
special-purpose kernel which is designed to provide security features which are 
appropriate specifically for cryptographic applications. Building the crypto code on top 
of an existing system is explicitly addressed by FIPS 140, the one standard which 
specifically targets crypto modules. This requires that, where the crypto module is run 
on top of an operating system which is used to isolate the crypto code from other code, 
it be evaluated at progressively higher Orange Book levels for each FIPS 140 level, so 
that security level 2 would require the software module to be implemented on a C2-
rated operating system. This provides something if an impedance mismatch between the 
actual security of equivalent hardware and software crypto module implementations, it’s 
possible that the these security levels were set so low out of concern that setting them 
any higher would make it impossible  to implement the higher FIPS 140 levels in 
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software due to a lack of systems evaluated at that level. For example trying to source a 
B2 or more realistically B3 system to provide an adequate level of security for the 
crypto software is almost impossible (the practicality of employing an OS in this class, 
whose members include Trusted Xenix, XTS 300, and Multos, speaks for itself) 
(Gutmann 2003).  
 
Another work which examines crypto software modules also recognises the need 
to protect the software through some form of security kernel based mechanism, but 
views implementation in terms of a device driver protected by an existing operating 
system kernel. The suggested approach is to modify an existing kernel to provide 
cryptographic support (Gutmann 2003).  
 
Two decades of experience in building high-assurance secure systems have 
shown that an approach which is based on the use of an application-specific rather than 
general-purpose kernel is the preferred one. For example in one survey of secure 
systems carried out during the initial burst of enthusiasm for the technology, most of the 
projects discussed were special-purpose filter or guard systems, and for the remaining 
general-purpose systems a recurring comment is of poor performance, occasional 
security problems, and frequent mentions of verification being left incomplete because 
it was too difficult. Although some implementors did struggle with the problem of 
kernel size and try to keep things as simple as possible, attempts to build general-
purpose secure OS kernels appear to have foundered, leaving application-specific and 
special-purpose kernels as the best prospect for successful implementation (Gutmann 
2003).  
 
 
3.4. Comparison of FIPS 140-2 with Technical Specifications. 
 
 
As mentioned before, security requirements that shall be satisfied by 
cryptographic modules conforming to FIPS 140-2, cover areas related to the design and 
implementation of a cryptographic module and they also cover the areas of  
cryptographic module specification; module ports and interfaces; roles, services, and 
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authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; 
cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; and of design assurance. An additional area 
concerned with the mitigation of other attacks is currently not tested but the vendor is 
required to document the implemented controls (e.g., differential power analysis, and 
TEMPEST). Table 1 summarizes the security requirements in each of these areas 
(WEB_2 2006) 
 
Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements in Each Security Level. 
(Source: FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules) 
 
 
A cryptographic module shall be tested against the requirements of each area 
addressed in Table 1. The cryptographic module shall be independently rated in each 
area. Several areas provide for increasing levels of security with cumulative security 
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requirements for each security level. In these areas, the cryptographic module will 
receive a rating that reflects the maximum security level for which the module fulfills 
all of the requirements of that area. In areas that do not provide for different levels of 
security (i.e., standard set of requirements), the cryptographic module will receive a 
rating commensurate with the overall level of security (WEB_2 2006). 
 
In addition to receiving independent ratings for each of the security areas, a 
cryptographic module will also receive an overall rating. The overall rating will indicate 
the minimum of the independent ratings received in the areas.  
 
 As any one can easily guess, this study is a comparative one, between FIPS 140-
2 and the formerly (before FIPS 140-2) used technical specifications for governmental 
cryptographic module procurements. The best way to compare is thought as to analyze 
all the specifications item by item and try to determine the similarities and/or 
differences with the ones in FIPS 140-2 above mentioned 11 areas in a table format. 
 
 
3.4.1. Construction of Comparison Table 
 
 
The next job after general explanation of the standard and technical 
specifications, is to form a “Comparison Table”, which compares FIPS 140-2 
requirements with the technical specifications formerly used for governmental 
procurements. Three different specifications were surveyed and analyzed item by item. 
The cells which left blank and shaded with gray in the comparison table designate that 
no corresponding item(s) were found in that specific technical specification for 
procurement. Since the comparison table; being as it is, is somewhat lengthy, included 
in APPENDIX A which is in CD that comes with this thesis. 
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3.4.2. Evaluation of Comparison Table 
 
 
 To evaluate the Comparison Table we need to compare each technical 
specification items with the ones FIPS has. Even though it is not possible to find one to 
one similarity between the  items of the specifications and the items in FIPS 140-2, we 
accepted the “likelihood” as sufficient for correspondance. 
 
 
3.4.2.1. Evaluation of Technical Specification # 1 
 
 
After analyzing the Technical Specification # 1, we can observe that the 
following FIPS items have no counterpart in Technical Specification # 1, possibly 
depending on the needs: 
 
• 4.3.2  Services. 
• 4.4 Finite State Model. 
• 4.5.2 Physical Security Requirements for Single-Chip Cryptographic                        
Modules. 
• 4.5.3 Physical Security Requirements for Multiple-Chip Embedded                        
Cryptographic Modules. 
• 4.5.4  Physical Security Requirements for Multiple-Chip Standalone 
Cryptographic Modules. 
• 4.6 Operational Environment. 
• 4.6.1  Operating System Requirements. 
• 4.7.1  Cryptographic Key Mgmt. Random Number Generators (RNG). 
• 4.7.2  Cryptographic Key Mgmt. Key Generation. 
• 4.7.3  Cryptographic Key Mgmt. Key Establishment. 
• 4.9.2  Self Tests Conditional Tests. 
• 4.10.1 Design Assurance Configuration Mgmt. 
• 4.10.2  Design Assurance Delivery and Operation. 
• 4.10.3  Design Assurance Development. 
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• 4.10.4  Design Assurance Guidance Documents. 
 
And the non-satisfying parts (wrt. security levels) of partially covered items are: 
• 4.2  Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces (Security Level 3,4). 
• 4.3.3  Authentication (Security Level 1,3,4). 
• 4.5.1  General Physical Security Requirements (Security Level 2,3,4). 
• 4.5.5.1 Environmental Failure Protection Features (Security Level 1). 
• 4.5.5.2 Environmental Failure Testing Procedures (Security Level 1). 
• 4.7.4  Cryptographic Key Mgmt. Key Entry and Output (Security Level 
3,4). 
• 4.8  Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), Electromagnetic Compatibility 
(EMC) (Security Level 3,4). 
 
Besides all, it is evaluated that the explanations related to the cyrptographic 
module are insufficient in Technical Specification # 1. 
 
 
3.4.2.2. Evaluation of Technical Specification # 2 
 
 
The Technical Specification # 2 is very similar, if not identical, to the Technical 
Specification # 1 from the missing items point of view. However, it does manage to 
have the below listed items which have their counterparts in FIPS 140-2. 
 
• 4.3.3 Authentication (Security Level 1). 
• 4.5.1  General Physical Security Requirements (Security Level 3). 
• 4.9.2 Self Tests Conditional Tests. 
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3.4.2.3. Evaluation of Technical Specification # 3 
  
 
 The almost identical evaluations with Technical Specification # 1 can be done 
for Technical Specification # 3, too. But Technical Specification # 3 also has items 
corresponding following FIPS 140-2 items, as different from Technical Specification # 
1: 
 
• 4.5.1 General Physical Security Requirements (Security Level 3). 
• 4.7.1 Cryptographic Key Mgmt.(Security Level 1). 
 
And the following FIPS 140-2 items have never been mentioned as different 
from Technical Specification#1: 
 
• 4.3.1 Roles. 
• 4.3.2 Services. 
• 4.3.3 Authentication. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
4.1 . Evaluations 
 
 
On the way for “Defining A Sample Template For Governmental 
Procurements of Cryptographic Products”, surveying the FIPS 140-2 itself, the 
studies related with the FIPS 140-2 (or concerning FIPS 140-2) and the comparing FIPS 
140-2 with Technical Specifications formerly used for procurement of cryptographic 
modules, shall result with the following evaluations of FIPS 140-2 as the main 
concentration and the basis of this study. 
 
 
4.1.1. The Strengths 
 
 
• FIPS 140-2 (with whole text containing punctuation) has been accepted as 
“ISO/IEC 19790:2006” and this tells us that similar official standardization 
work will be initiated in Turkey in near future. This also shall lead the 
establishment of additional “Validation Labs” worldwide, possibly in 
Turkey, too. 
 
• FIPS 140-2 (or ISO/IEC 19790:2006) has explicit superiority in defining a 
cryptographic module over the technical specifications formerly used. In the 
specification of cryptographic modules “Services, Finite State Model, 
Physical Security Requirements, Operational Environment, Cryptographic 
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Key Management, Self Tests (Conditional Tests) and Design Assurance” 
sections have no counterpart in the analyzed specifications and they are 
where the FIPS 140-2 obtains its superiority. 
 
• Scan based test is a powerful test technique and scan chains can also be used 
as a side channel attack to recover secret keys from a hardware 
implementation of DES. By using one build-in self-test scheme, the internal 
status of cryptographic chips will not be scanned out and such scan based 
attacks can be avoided. Luckily enough, this kind of self-test is already 
recommended by FIPS 140-2 be the physical security requirement of 
cryptographic chips (WEB_6 2006). 
 
• However, there is not any single item which refers to this in either of the 
surveyed technical specifications in this study. 
 
 
4.1.2. The Weaknesses 
 
 
• FIPS 140-2  is mainly focused on “hardware modules”, and is not well 
adapted to software modules (WEB_6 2006) FIPS 140-2 demonstrates 
obvious evidences for this assessment in section “4.5. Physical Security 
Requirements”. 
 
• FIPS 140-2 covers somewhat too narrow scopes of the system to be tested. 
Better alignment with the “Common Criteria” is required, and the security 
vulnerabilities of functional protocols need to be addressed better (WEB_6 
2006). 
 
• If you need the flexibility of having FIPS 140-2 Validation for multiple 
operating system platforms, the ideal security level is FIPS 140-2 Security 
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Level 1. At FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2, you become restricted to the 
platforms that are approved according to Common Criteria (WEB_2 2006). 
 
• FIPS 140-2 Validation is platform specific: individual validation certificate 
numbers are required for each platform. Moreover, any changes or additions 
to a validated product require revalidation, incurring additional costs 
(WEB_2 2006). 
 
• The complex process of FIPS 140-2 validation shows that excellence in 
creating solid cryptographic algorithms and modules is difficult to achieve. 
Of the eleven areas, the following four areas are likely of greatest difficulty: 
“physical security, self-tests, random number generation and key 
management” (WEB_6 2006). 
 
• Specifically, as far as “side channel attacks” are concerned, FIPS 140-1 did 
not explicitly mention the security of cryptographic modules against side 
channel attacks, while FIPS 140-2 only deal briefly with the specification of 
mitigation of attacks for which no testable requirements are currently 
available (WEB_6 2006). In Section “4.11. Mitigation of Other Attacks” a 
few well-known SCA is concerned and they are: “Power Analysis”, “Timing 
Analysis”, “Fault Induction” and “TEMPEST”. Nevertheless the following 
common and known SCAs which have no place in FIPS 140-2 should have 
been discussed and evaluated in paragraphs of the future FIPS 
documentation: “EM Attack”, “Acoustic Attack”, “Visible Light Attack”, 
“Error Message Attack”, “Cache-based Attack”, “Frequency Based Attack”, 
“Scan-based Attack”.     
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4.2. Results  
 
 
In the light of the above evaluations, “to define a sample template for 
governmental procurements of cryptographic products” the following results are 
derived: 
 
• The present context of FIPS 140-2 which is mainly focusing on “hardware 
modules” is thought to be acceptable and sufficient for the aim of this study, 
since the demand for software cryptographic modules is none or negligible 
comparing with the demands for hardware/firmware modules of 
governmental organizations. 
 
• Even though it is evaluated and claimed in a study that, better alignment 
with the “Common Criteria” is required (WEB_6 2006) , in section “4.6.1. 
Operating System Requirements” of FIPS 140-2, target operating system 
is required to meet the conditions of Common Criteria “EAL2 to EAL4” 
respectively for “Security Levels 2 to 4”. And any further interaction with 
Common Criteria components, but the ones with operating systems, seems 
unnecessary due to almost perfect inclusion of FIPS 140-2 on other topics. 
 
• The requirements of standard FIPS 140-2 should be extended to a larger 
scale and to cover the following aspects: “analysis of cryptographic 
protocols”; “analysis of effectiveness of key management”; “analysis of 
side channels or similar vulnerabilities” (WEB_6 2006).   
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4.3. Recommendations  
 
 
  Ultimately, FIPS 140-2 (or ISO/IEC 19790:2006) is recommended and thought 
to be used as the basis document to prepare a sample template specification. To form the 
facilitating template due to demands of the governmental organization, “Sample 
Template Specification for Cryptographic Modules” and facilitative “Sample 
Template Specification Matrix for Cryptographic Modules” have been prepared (in 
Turkish) under the guidance of above evaluations & related results and by depending on 
“M.S.B. Teknik Şartname Hizmetleri Yönergesi (MSY.: 202-12 (B))” and placed in 
APPENDIX B and APPENDIX C to this study, respectively.  
 
 The lack of any paragraph related to “Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols” in 
FIPS 140-2 has no sense and may result with deficiency in “Validation of 
Cryptographic Modules”. To overcome this probable problem, the sub-topic of 
“Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols” is recommended to place and placed as a 
paragraph in section “2.12. Analysis of Cryptographic Protocol” of proposed Sample 
Template Specification. 
  
Due to insufficiency of “FIPS 140-2 Section 4.11. Mitigation of Other 
Attacks” for providing solutions to most of SCAs, but only Power Analysis, Timing 
Analysis, Fault Induction and TEMPEST, the rest of the well-known SCAs and the 
known counter-measures for each attack are recommended to place and placed in the 
section “2.11. Mitigation of Other Attacks” of proposed Sample Template 
Specification. 
 
 Since “Key Management” is often an afterthought in the cryptographic 
development process and this result cryptographic subsystems too often to fail to 
support the key management functionality and protocols, it is a must to test Key 
Management before going any further for validation of any cryptographic module. But, 
there is no testing method avaliable for “Key Management” currently, since FIPS 171 
“Key Management Using ANSI X9.17” is withdrawn by NIST on February 8, 2005 due 
to withdrawal of X9.17 by ANSI. But again “Recommendation for Key Management 
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Guideline- Part 1:General” has been approved by NIST as “NIST Special 
Publication 800-57” in August 2005 and this might be accepted as one in the hand and 
better than nothing. Besides that, this first part is thought to be quite informative and 
providing initiative for the rest of the Key Management concerns. So the items forcing 
to prepare “Key Management Specification for Cryptographic Modules” are 
recommended to place and placed in the section “Key Management” of only 
APPENDIX (Documentation Requirements) of APPENDIX B. 
  
The word by word translation of “FIPS 140-2: Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules” into Turkish is prepared to facilitate to construct the Sample 
Template Specification and also to be research source in Turkish for future studies 
about this topic. FIPS 140-2 original and the Turkish translation of the FIPS 140-2 are 
placed in APPENDIX D to this study. 
 
 The Sample Template Specification Matrix in APPENDIX C might seem to be 
complex at first. That’s why it is also recommended to use APPENDIX E “Web Based 
User Interface” which is facilitating to simply construct a specification template in 
accordance with the governmental organization demands. 
 
 
4.4. Future Work 
 
 
Due to insufficiency of time and capability some works are left undone for the 
future studies. It is evaluated that the following future studies will provide additional 
and useful knowledge-base on this topic: 
• Translation of  “Derived Test Requirements [DTR] for FIPS PUB 140-2” 
into Turkish. 
• Construction of “Derived Test Requirements” (in Turkish) as an annex to 
Sample Template Specification. 
•  Implementation of more intelligent and facilitative “Specification 
Construction Software” for governmental organizations. 
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